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Defining Terrorism:
A Comparison of Several Judicial-Executive Dialogues
by
Noemi Gal-Or 
ABSTRACT
The events of 9/11 have forced upon the entire community of Western
states a re-assessment of their respective anti-terrorism policies and
laws. It released an intense discussion seeking to update and re-
characterize the post-9/11 state of international relations producing
a wave of renewed attempts to legally (re)define terrorism. The main
challenge is to determine whether terrorism in its twenty-first centu-
ry manifestation warrants recognition as a component within the
doctrine of armed conflict and what would be the effects of such
transformation. This article compares how the judiciary in Western
liberal and pluralist democracies has been tackling this dilemma
and affecting respective legislative responses. The article offers pre-
liminary thoughts as guidelines to the design of parameters for an
approach to anti-terrorism security that is common to North America
(and the rest of the world). To this effect, it contextualizes the rele-
vant North American jurisprudential developments within a sample
of other Western-oriented judicial track records. The article finds
that the North American dialogue (in Canada and the US) among the
three branches of government is departing from two opposite ends of
one and the same Western War on Terror adjudicative spectrum. This
context appears to be slowly, but eventually, progressing toward con-
version, effecting a common re-characterization and definition of
terrorism, anti-terrorism, and their place within the doctrine of
armed conflict.
INTRODUCTION
The arrival of international terrorism at America’s shores on 11 September
2001 has forced upon the entire community of Western states a re-assessment of
their respective anti-terrorism policies and laws. Conspicuous disagreement
regarding the war in Iraq juxtaposed with a general consensus regarding
Afghanistan reveal confusion as to the understanding of the nature of the armed
conflict and indecisiveness regarding suggestions that a new form of interna-
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tional law has been unfolding. A noteworthy outcome has been the intense dis-
cussion seeking to update and re-characterise the state of international relations
since 9/11, accompanied by renewed attempts to legally (re) define terrorism.1
In other words, does the accumulation of terrorist attacks in the West — but
also elsewhere in the world — represent a state of armed conflict (“war”) with
other states, in which these states sponsor or support terrorism? Or, is it a state
of armed conflict with a new international actor — the non-state actor (NSA)? If
so, does this represent a new type of international war? Moreover, is terrorism to
be considered an act of armed conflict falling within the paradigm of interna-
tional humanitarian law or simply a criminal offense?
This article compares how, in liberal pluralist democracies, the above men-
tioned has been tackled in adjudicative cases and legislative responses to adju-
dicative decisions. It is intended to offer preliminary thoughts as guidelines to the
design of parameters for a North American (and international) anti-terrorism
security common approach. Since this research was originally presented,2 dock-
ets related to the War on Terror have been mushrooming. The article identifies a
number of selected cases as representative trailblazers indicating directions that
the legal branch in North America would come to follow. The 2005 Ontario
Rutherford decision of Khawaja vs. Re,3 relaxing the evidentiary burden of the
Crown in matters of terrorism, and the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) case
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),4 regarding the constitu-
tionality of the anti-terrorism law’s (subsumed in Canada’s immigration law)
security certificate, paved the way to legislative amendments. Among other
things, these decision have led to the recent Canada (Justice) v. Khadr5 that
ordered the disclosure of the Canadian Khadr-related documents. In the US, the
War on Terror sparked a fierce dialogue among, especially, the executive and the
judiciary. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,6 which held that the military commission prose-
cuting an alleged al-Qaeda member captured during the US Afghanistan inva-
sion and kept at the Guantánamo Bay detention camp lacked power to proceed,
served as a major trigger to the Military Commissions Act  (MCA) 20067 bypass-
ing of this US Supreme Court decision. It serves as an important precedent in the
recent Boumediene v. Bush8 judgments which found in favour of the rights of for-
eign Guantánamo detainees under American constitutional law. The paper con-
textualizes these North American developments in an overall Western-oriented
judicial track record. For comparative purposes, it refers to the following promi-
nent “off shore” cases: The Israeli High Court of justice (HCJ) decision regard-
ing an application for a conditional order and a temporary injunction against tar-
geted state-killings;9 the European Court rule on United Nations (UN) and
European Union (EU) terror suspect blacklisting;10 and the German criminal
complaint against Donald Rumsfeld and others.11
This comparison should assist in identifying and synthesising commonal-
ties and distinguishing differences in the approaches taken by the respective tri-
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bunals and legislatures. It is hoped that such rudimentary mapping will con-
tribute to the many endeavors12 aimed at isolating the core issues dominating the
legal conceptual lull regarding a democratic, rule-of-law-based adequate anti-ter-
rorism policy. 
Which law governs?
The main challenge to the anti-terrorism policies adopted by “Rule of
Law”-minded states consists in the “pigeon-holing” of the conduct targeted by
legislation and cases brought to trial. There are several competing conceptual tra-
jectories, which lead to different “pigeon-holing” options. The challenge is to
juxtapose them and explore whether there is a crossing point at which they all
meet. Among the two major trajectories — level of governance and terrorism
prevention — this article chooses to focus only on the former. It comments on
the branches this trajectory is leading off as guided by the cases and legislation
mentioned above. It concludes with a discussion of the commonalties linking the
approaches at the different levels of governance and the differences separating
them and offers observations concerning the import of the comparison for future
international and national legislation regarding terrorism. 
Level of Governance
The approach to anti-terrorism is first and foremost determined by the level
of governance at which it is being addressed. This bias results in a kaleidoscop-
ic image of terrorism whereby jurisdictional legal boundaries mistakenly decon-
struct the nature of the terrorist offense. Terrorism today is almost exclusively of
an international, trans-boundary nature. A principled approach to terrorism that
does not distinguish between definitions of terrorism based on a domestic versus
international dichotomy is certainly overdue. Rather, the relevant distinction
applies to the scope of jurisdiction of domestic versus international tribunals and
the supremacy of legislation (domestic parliamentary versus international) with
regards to acts of terrorism. This arises clearly from the comparison between the
Khawaja and Charkaoui (Canadian) with Yusuf, Kadi, and Ayadi (EU cases), the
Israeli Barak Decision, Rumsfeld and Tenet, and Hamdan.
The National Level
Canada
In Khawaja, the applicant challenged the constitutionality of his indictment
under the Terrorism Section, Part II.1 of the Criminal Code and according to s. 52
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and s. 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982
(Charter).13 In its ruling, the Court explicitly placed the Anti-Terrorism Act with-
in the international context of international terrorism and noted that “ . . . there is
a developing context, both domestically and internationally, in which any consid-
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eration and evaluation of the legislation in question must be undertaken.”14 It
identified, in the analysis of legislative intent, that according to Anne McLellan,
then Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, “criminal sanction may
not be enough”15 to deter terrorist suicide bombing. Moreover, in its reasoning,
the Court compared domestic with international law, namely criminal law,
humanitarian law, and the law of crimes against humanity, when addressing the
difference between motive for a crime, which is non-justiciable under all these
laws, and intent (mens rea) which is a crucial element of crime.16 Yet, at the end
of the day, the Court shied away from qualifying the legislation as a matter of
protecting national security: “. . . we believe that this characterization has the
potential to go too far and would have implications that far outstrip legislative
intent.”17 To the contrary, it cloaked Khawaja in the safe context of domestic
criminal law and consequently produced a judgment focusing on “the freedom-
protected aspects of the lives of those on whom any shadow of suspicion may
fall, with or without justification.”18 It is not a ruling on terrorism and national
security, and national security concerns do not make it to a Charter s. 1 test.
Unlike in Khawaja, the Court in Charkaoui did tackle the constitutionali-
ty of the security certificate in terms of national security. The Court grappled
with the question of “How Do Security Considerations Affect the [Charter]
Section 7 Analysis?”19 It recognized that:
[m]ore particularly, the Court has repeatedly recognized that nation-
al security considerations can limit the extent of disclosure of infor-
mation to the affected individual. . . . Fundamental justice requires
substantial compliance with the venerated principle that a person
whose liberty is in jeopardy must be given an opportunity to know
the case to meet, and an opportunity to meet the case. Yet the imper-
ative of the protection of society may preclude this. Information may
be obtained from other countries or from informers on condition that
it not be disclosed. Or it may simply be so critical that it cannot be
disclosed without risking public security. This is a reality of our
modern world. If s. 7 is to be satisfied, either the person must be
given the necessary information, or a substantial substitute for that
information must be found. Neither is the case here.20
Nevertheless, the consideration of national security did not lead the Court
to a different type of reasoning. Similar to Khawaja, the Supreme Court of
Canada implicitly recognised the international nature of terrorism, at least the
conflict of law framework governing terrorism, and re-iterated the state’s duty to
comply with its international agreements. Equally, as in Khawaja, it refrained
from contemplating particular conflict of law issues, namely the interface
between domestic criminal law and international criminal law and armed conflict.
The only reference to the law of war21 is of secondary significance and indirect.22
In Khawaja, the applicant was a Canadian citizen, a fact that would
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exclude the application of the law of war and trigger jurisdiction under domestic
law. In Charkaoui, however, one appellant, Adil Charkaoui, was a permanent res-
ident, while the two co-appellants, Hassan Almrei and Mohamed Harkat, were
foreign nationals at the time who had been recognized as Convention refugees.23
The appeal, which was based on immigration law, dealt with the detention of for-
eign nationals and the differential treatment of citizens and non-citizens.24 The
Court, however, did not entertain the possibility of raising the question in the
context of the law of war. Had it identified terrorism as an act of armed conflict,
such an interpretation might have been required to determine whether the non-
citizens in this case had been enemies of Canada and, as such, whether they had
been civilian or combatant enemies. Thus, like Khawaja, Charkaoui also referred
the issue back to Parliament, as a matter for legislation. This approach is re-iter-
ated in the two relevant and significant recent cases of  Hape and Khadr. In the
latter, the Court reaffirmed its opinion in R. v. Hape25: “The principles of inter-
national law and comity of nations, which normally require that Canadian offi-
cials operating abroad comply with local law, do not extend to participation in
processes that violate Canada’s international human rights obligations.”26
Clearly, neither the Canadian Parliament (Anti-Terrorism Act) nor the
Courts are yet ready to pigeon-hole terrorism as a matter also pertaining to the
law of armed conflict. At the other end of the spectrum are the American judicial
decision in Hamdan and the legislation of the MCA, and the German complaint
in Rumsfeld & Tenet, both representing an approach different from the Canadian
examples.
The United States
In Hamdan, a Yemeni national alleged to have been an al-Qaeda member,
who was apprehended in Afghanistan and detained at Guantánamo Bay, chal-
lenged the legality of his treatment by the US as per the law of armed conflict.
Since the US was engaged in an armed conflict in Afghanistan, and in spite of
the US position that persons apprehended during that activity had been “unlaw-
ful combatants”27 and were therefore not entitled to the protection of the law of
armed conflict, the case has clearly been pigeon-holed as pertaining to the law of
armed conflict.28 It accords also with the characterization of 9/11 by the UN
Security Council (SC) Resolution 1368 (2001), based on the UN Charter Ch. 7,
which authorized the NATO operations in Afghanistan on the grounds that
Afghanistan was a state host to terrorists.29 The UN has thus lent credibility to
the US claim against the exclusivity of international criminal law as the legal
framework to address acts of terrorism.
Applying the law of armed conflict to terrorism does not obviate human
rights laws and the protection of the individual. In Hamdan, the US Supreme
Court (USSC) found international law to be judicially cognizable in US courts
by way of reference in an Act of Congress.30 The Court determined that the law
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of armed conflict, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions (and therefore also
Common Article 331 providing for the protection of the individual civil person
and the corresponding duty of the armed forces) was applicable to the treatment
of detainees. It found, inter alia, that the relevant military commission estab-
lished by the President was unlawful and lacked power to proceed since it was
incompatible with the standards of Common Article 3.
As in the Canadian cases, this implied that the legislation pertaining to the
military commissions must be amended. Indeed, the Executive responded to the
Hamdan judgment by instructing the Defence Department leadership to comply
with Common Article 3 provisions.32 The administration’s revision of the MCA
reaffirmed the disputed characterization of the non-state combatant as unlawful
combatant by expanding it, retroactively eliminated the right of habeas corpus
for alien enemy combatants (a violation of the legal principle against ex post
facto criminalization) and limited the ability of individuals to seek protection
under the Common Article 3 in certain proceedings.33 Practically, 
[m]any of the enumerated crimes are composites of rules drawn from
the law of international armed conflict and the law of non-interna-
tional armed conflict. While these two bodies of law have converged
to a degree, significant differences remain. . . . [B]ecause the US
views the conflict with Al-Qaeda as a non-international armed con-
flict, many of the enumerated crimes would not qualify as war
crimes as traditionally understood given the narrower scope of rules
applicable in such conflicts under common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. . . .  Certainly, international law provides no privilege
to kill in a noninternational armed conflict; however, this simply
means that the person could be held criminally responsible under
ordinary domestic law, not the law of armed conflict.34
At the same time, the MCA recognized the constitutional judicial power of
the USSC and the US lower federal courts as extending to the treaties of the US.
Moreover, the MCA criminalized certain serious violations of common Article 3,
thus incorporating the Article in domestic law with regard to “an armed conflict
not of an international character.”35 However, it omitted reference to the Hamdan
judgment’s requirement of “judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples.”36 In retrospect, Hamdan led directly to
Boumediene where the USSC found that the Guantanámo detainees’ constitu-
tional entitlement to meaningful habeas corpus review by federal civilian judges
had been violated. It also calls on the other branches of government to produce
a “workable” concept of terrorism while acknowledging that such task may in
the future fall within the purview of the judiciary:
Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited
duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war
powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dan-
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gerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this
luxury. . . .  The political branches, . . . can engage in a genuine
debate about how best to preserve constitutional values while pro-
tecting the Nation from terrorism. . . . It bears repeating that our
opinion does not address the content of law that governs petitioners’
detention.37
Germany
The Rumsfeld & Tenet complaint, filed in Germany38 on behalf of nine
Iraqi citizens incarcerated in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, and one Saudi national held in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and in the name of a long list of international interests
and interesees, alleged torture and war crimes in the said prisons. It also raised
questions regarding the impact of the revised (2006) MCA on Germany’s duties
of comity and “complementarity” in international law,39 as well as the culpabil-
ity of lawyers when in the service of their government.40 The complaint, which
is still pending, was filed under Germany’s 2002 Code of Crimes against
International Law (CCAIL) adopted consequent to Germany’s adherence to the
treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). The complaint brands
the issue as a matter of human rights law in general, particularly international
criminal law (which has a nexus to humanitarian law [jus in bello]). Investigation
of the complaint was denied on several grounds, including the inappropriate
exercise of Germany’s extra-territorial jurisdiction, lack of evidence, potential
encouragement of future frivolous complaints, and a vague reference to comity.41
The complainants appealed in November 2007; a decision is still pending. The
complaint has largely been dealt with by the German federal prosecutor as a mat-
ter of German criminal law. It is too early to determine where the case fits on the
spectrum of levels of governance regarding the selection of types of law.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that issues concerning the corre-
spondence of domestic and international law, as well as international criminal
law and the law of armed conflict pertaining to the definitions of war versus ter-
rorism, will unfold as it proceeds.
Israel
The Barak Decision should be placed somewhere along the legal spectrum
closer to the American and German extreme rather than the Canadian side. It
goes farther than the American examples in an attempt to reconcile the existing
tension between domestic and international law, and among the various types of
international laws, and seeks to clear the cloud shrouding the politics, and legal
lacuna, surrounding terrorism. Unlike the Canadian cases, the HCJ dares to
address the intricacies of the new situation head on. In fact, it has no other option
available.
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The Barak Decision came in response to an application by two Israeli
human rights organizations submitting that the Israeli policy of targeted killing
was patently illegal, contrary to international law, the law of the State of Israel,
and the fundamental principles of human morality.42 In the context of this paper,
the Barak Decision stands out in its explicit two-prong approach: the Court asked
itself which law applied to the case, and considered the legal applicability of a
new third status of international personality (in addition to civilian and combat-
ant). Having addressed these issues, it then interpreted and applied the extant
legal provisions. For instance, it considered the test of proportionality, judicial
review, justiciability, etc.
Unlike the Canadian, and more similar to the American and German, cases
there was no disagreement as to the armed conflict contextual nature of this case.
Mainly, the applicants maintained that the governing law was that of non-inter-
national armed conflict (to the exclusion of the law of international conflict) and
the law of foreign occupation. The latter gave rise to the duty of the occupant to
police and enforce the law within the territory occupied in accordance with the
Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian population and its two
additional protocols of 1977.43 While recognizing the conduct addressed by the
policy of targeted killing as terrorism, the appropriate counter-terrorism policy
must fall under international criminal law and Israeli national emergency legis-
lation. In the alternative the international law of armed conflict recognized only
two international personalities — combatants and civilians.44
The applicants’ submission led the Court to question whether there existed
a third category of “unlawful combatants” and within it to adopt a position with
regard to the yet international legally incomplete definition of “hostile act.”45
The Court then turned to the application of this position and asked whether ter-
ror organizations and their member fighters were combatants entitled to rights
under the law of armed conflict. Were they civilians who directly participated in
the armed conflict or, rather, neither combatants nor civilians? “What, then, is the
status of these terrorists?”46 It determined that the status of an individual person
as an “unlawful combatant”47 was a matter pertaining not only to national crim-
inal law but equally to the international law of international armed conflicts.
Civilians who are unlawful combatants are a legitimate object for
attack, and hence are not enjoying the rights of civilians who are not
unlawful combatants, provided they are participating concurrently
and directly in the hostile acts. As we saw, they are also not enjoying
the rights of combatants. For instance, the law of prisoners of war
does not apply to them.48
Similar to the other national courts reviewed, the HCJ refrained from ren-
dering judgment on this question:
We will not adopt a position in the question whether it is desirable to
recognise this third category. The question before us is not of nor-
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mative law but of extant law. In our opinion, regarding everything in
the matter of the extant law we do not have sufficient data to enable
us to recognise the existence of this third category. This, according
to the extant state of the international law, whether conventional or
customary [ref. to Cassese]. It is difficult for us to see how it would
be possible to recognise a third category in the interpretive frame-
work of The Hague and Geneva Conventions. . . . Nevertheless, a
new reality sometimes requires new interpretation. Rules developed
at the backdrop of a reality that had now changed will now have to
receive a dynamic interpretation which will adapt them, in the frame-
work of agreed rules of interpretation, to the new reality [references
to previous HCJ decisions]. In the spirit of this interpretation, we
shall now approach the laws of international customary law dealing
with the status of civilians who are also unlawful combatants.49
The essence of the judgment in the Barak Decision boils down to the unan-
imous judicial conclusion that, under customary international law, as much as it
was inappropriate to determine a prioiri that every targeted killing was forbid-
den, it was equally inappropriate to determine that every targeted killing was
permitted. While the laws applying to such policy were determined by custom-
ary international law, the legality of each single attack in the execution of the
policy must be determined according to rules on a case by case basis.50 Although
criticized for its evasiveness and for dangerously throwing out of balance the
international legal distinction between combatant and civilian51 and remembered
for the unfortunate impractical requirement of the state to have “founded infor-
mation”52 prior to classifying the status of a civilian caught in hostilities,53 the
judgment will most likely become a reference point (to follow or distinguish) in
future adjudications by both Israeli and other courts. It bravely breaks ground by
tackling head-on the grey area wherein the distinction between civilian and com-
batant in the twenty-first century’s reality of armed conflict has become increas-
ingly blurred. Its emphasis on, and test prescribed concerning, the independent
judicial review in the ex post facto evaluation of any targeted killing, will most
likely serve as a tentative model.
The International (European Regional) Level
Unlike the Canadian courts, yet similar to the other national court cases
and the legislations reviewed above, the European Court of First Instance (CFI)
Yusuf, Kadi, and Ayadi decisions appear to be “trapped” in an entanglement of
international criminal law and the law of war. The decisions resulted from a peti-
tion by three EU residents who were listed on the UN Sanctions Committee list
of targeted persons and its consequent incorporation within Community law. The
list features as one of the tasks mandated to the Sanctions Committee established
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999).54 The petitioners
sought the annulment of their blacklisting by arguing that it infringed upon their
The Journal of Conflict Studies
103
rights to property, fair hearing, and effective judicial remedy. One applicant fur-
ther argued that the EU lacked competence to adopt the listing regulation.55 The
cases thus raised the issue of the powers of the Sanctions Committee and ques-
tioned the extent to which the EU member states, as UN member states, the EU,
and the EU Courts, were bound to comply by UNSC resolutions.56 In Yusuf,
Kadi, and Ayadi, the CFI found UNSC resolutions to be taking precedence over
community law, including over fundamental rights as protected therein, and that
the community and its courts were bound by UNSC resolutions. It rejected the
argument that community law was autonomous from UNSC resolutions (i.e., UN
Charter obligations). The Court equally found that the UNSC Resolution did not
violate jus cogens.
Two significant observations concerning the convergence of levels of gov-
ernance in legal matters of terrorism arise from this case. First, the Sanction
Committee’s procedures, which have been criticized for lack of transparency and
due process safeguards,57 were potentially frustrating certain member states’
compliance (e.g., regarding constitutional incompatibility). In this regard, the
Canadian courts were probably wise to refrain from digging too deeply into
international criminal law. Second, the UNSC Resolution 1368 (2001), which,
based on UN Charter Ch. 7 authorized NATO operations in Afghanistan on the
ground that Afghanistan had been hosting terrorists, impinged on the exclusivity
of international criminal law in matters of terrorism. It opened the gates to treat
terrorism also in the framework of the international law of armed conflict. In
combining the rationale of both UNSC resolutions (regarding the Sanction
Committee and Afghanistan, respectively), a new legal situation has emerged
wherein the boundaries between international criminal law and the law of war
were blurred. Consequently, if the UNSC commands legislative supremacy,
adjustments are warranted at the level of members’ national legislations (includ-
ing members of the EU). National courts will also be called on to take these mat-
ters into consideration.
Level of Governance Approach: Commonalties and Differences
All the cases reviewed here involved national security issues and concerns
of defense also against external (foreign) threats. The Canadian cases purported
that the reasons for the state’s application of its Anti-Terrorism Act was based on
the involved persons’ connections with persons and organisations outside of
Canada and on the extra-territorial and international context of the events.
Similarly, in the American case the alien detainees were kept in detention for
activities against, and outside of, the US. In the German case, the complaint was
grounded in the harm foreign complainants suffered arising from US policy
when in Iraq and Afghanistan. And in the Israeli case, non-Israeli citizens were
subject to an extraterritorial targeted killings policy. In the EU case, the black-
listing of foreign citizens was contested. Thus, all the cases involved also non-
nationals in one way or another.
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Obviously, the cases and legislations reviewed here are closely related to
the foreign policy of the concerned states. On its face, this would suffice to jus-
tify consideration of relevant international legal provisions. As was shown, how-
ever, such consideration appears to be stretching across a continuum that ranges
from merely procedural consideration, as in the Canadian and German cases,
through concerted review and interpretation juxtaposing international with
national legal provisions, as in the Israeli and American cases, and up to analy-
sis according to mainly international and regional European law. The levels of
governance trajectory shows that at the national level, the more the issue is
“boxed in” as an international issue,58 the greater the number of, and the clearer
are, the law reform elements that arise. However, at the regional confederal and
international levels of governance (Europe), where international law applies
prima facie, inconsistency between branches of international law (criminal or
war related) becomes more pronounced. It will therefore be interesting to see
which approach will sway either the UNSC or the International Court of Justice
(and special tribunals, e.g. war tribunals and International Criminal Court) — the
two prominent sources of international law. It appears indeed that the UNSC has
already embarked, albeit hesitantly, on that course.
It is important to note that in all the above cases the state or the confeder-
ation of states, appeared before the courts as defendants (or respondents). The
governments were prompted by claimants and applicants to address legislative
and executive provisions that lacked (and continue to lack) clarity. None of the
governments voluntarily initiated any judicial review of its terrorism legislation
or policy.
Moreover, in the Canadian 2007 Charkaoui case, the legal proceedings
began, in fact, early and close to the issuance of the security certificates. All
along, appellants remained in detention under this law since 2001, 2002, and
2003 respectively.59 In the case of the 2006 Barak Decision, the application was
submitted in 2002.60 Thus, both Canadian and Israeli courts did not let them-
selves be pressed by time.61 In Charkaoui, the Court concluded its judgment as
follows:
However, in order to give Parliament time to amend the law, I would
suspend this declaration [that the IRPA’s procedure is inconsistent
with the Charter and of no force and effect] for one year from the date
of this judgment. If the government chooses to go forward with the
proceedings to have the reasonableness of Mr. Charkaoui’s certificate
determined during the one-year suspension period, the existing
process under the IPRA will apply. After one year, the certificates . . .
will lose the “reasonable” status that has been conferred them, and it
will be open to them to apply to have the certificates quashed. . . .62
In the Barak Decision, the Court halted the hearings during 2005, follow-
ing a declaration by the government of Israel whereby it temporarily suspended
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exercise of the policy of targeted killings. It renewed the hearings only after the
government re-activated the policy and following the applicants’ request for
resumption of hearings. Canada’s and Israel’s sense of urgency in addressing the
applicants’ submissions suggests that the courts were awaiting more determina-
cy at the domestic level regarding the application of international law. While I
leave the discussion of this detail for another time, it is worthwhile to take note
of a transcript of military hearings (combatant status review tribunal) at
Guantánamo Bay released by the Pentagon.63 It suggested that regardless of
whether the state targeted by terrorists considered itself to be in a state of inter-
national armed conflict, the “enemy” has been seeing itself fighting such a war.64
If the information received is legitimate and had been offered candidly and vol-
untarily by the detainee Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,65 then it would add to
admissions by similar terrorists and may assist legislators — international and
national — in fleshing out further legal clarifications. The said detainee referred
to himself as a participant in a military campaign but also as a revolutionary: he
described his role as “the ‘military operational commander for all foreign opera-
tions around the world’ for Al Qaeda.”66 Such a role would put him within the
purview of the international law of war — not international criminal law of ter-
rorism — including the law of the ICC. If and when Shaikh Mohammed is tried
for war crimes by a military commission,67 the proceedings may further con-
tribute to clarifying the legal characterisation or definitions of state of war, hos-
tilities, armed conflict, and terrorism and assist in hammering out the issue of a
third status of natural international personality.
CONCLUSION
The dialogue between the judiciary and the executive and legislative lev-
els of government reviewed here suggests that the statement that “[i]t is cold
comfort that there are by now more than a dozen UN conventions against partic-
ular manifestations of terrorism . . . “68 has been premature. It is inaccurate to
suggest that the conventions “do not lead significantly closer to a shared under-
standing of the problem.”69 Indeed, when considered from a level of governance
approach, and precisely because “the war on terror created a permanent state of
exception,”70 both hard pressed national and international courts, as well as
national and international executives, are being forced to reach hard conclusions.
As this article has shown, the North American dialogue among the three branch-
es of government is departing from two opposite ends of one and the same
Western War on Terror adjudicative spectrum. This context appears to be slowly,
but eventually, progressing towards conversion, effecting a common re-charac-
terization and definition of terrorism, anti-terrorism, and its place within the doc-
trine of armed conflict.
Noemi Gal-Or is Director of the Institute for Transborder Studies and Professor
in the Department of Political Science at Kwantlen University College.
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